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Empirical studies usually ﬁnd that women’s labor supply
is more elastic than men’s at the level of the market, but
some researchers argue informally that this relationship
reverses at the level of the individual ﬁrm.
(Boal & Ransom 1997, p. 99)
1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom tells us that women’s market labor supply is more elastic than
men’s. This insight results from a vast number of empirical studies which investigate
whether and how much labor individuals supply by using data from individual- or
household-level surveys. Theoretical labor supply models also take the perspective
of employees. This means that employers’ perspective, i.e. the demand-side of labor,
usually plays only a minor role.
From the perspective of a single ﬁrm, however, it does not matter whether an in-
dividual supplies labor generally, but whether he or she supplies it to this ﬁrm or
not. Furthermore, not only unemployed but also employed workers are potential
suppliers of labor to this ﬁrm. Therefore ﬁrm-level labor supply diﬀers substantially
from market-level labor supply. Although women’s labor supply is more elastic than
men’s at the market-level, it might be less elastic than men’s at the ﬁrm-level, giving
rise to steeper labor supply curves for women to the ﬁrm. Reasons for this could
be diﬀerent preferences over non-wage job characteristics and a higher degree of
immobility. For instance, women’s job moves might be less motivated by pecuniary
considerations, but to a larger extent by the job’s location (e.g., near nursery school)
or the working hours oﬀered (e.g., the possibility of working part-time).
Bearing this in mind, proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms may take advantage of gender-speciﬁc
diﬀerences in supply elasticities by exercising wage discrimination, i.e. by paying dif-
ferent wages to women and men, ceteris paribus. This, in turn, could be one reason of
the gender pay gap which is another stylized fact of labor markets. Theoretical con-
siderations on this sort of wage discrimination originate from Robinson (1933), who
was the ﬁrst to apply Pigou’s (1932) concept of third-degree price discrimination at
a commodity market to the labor market. Hence, Robinsonian discrimination diﬀers
fundamentally from Becker’s (1971) concept of discrimination due to distaste be-
cause ﬁrms’ actions when engaging in wage discrimination remain proﬁt-maximizing
as their considerations are not biased by irrational prejudices.
Since Robinson’s (1933) analysis assumes monopsony power in the classic sense of
a single employer one might doubt its relevance. The new monopsony literature,4
however, whose ﬁrst systematic exposition and application to nearly all traditional
topics of labor economics is given by Manning (2003), emphasizes that monopsony
power may even arise if there are many ﬁrms competing for workers. Models of
new monopsony yield upward-sloping ﬁrm-level labor supply curves (even without
concentration on the demand-side) due to search frictions, heterogenous preferences
among workers and mobility costs. Thus, Robinsonian discrimination might be a
widespread phenomenon in actual labor markets.
Whether ﬁrm-level labor supply diﬀers between men and women has been investi-
gated in no more than two studies (according to our knowledge). Barth & Dale-Olsen
(1999) ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ turnover rates are less elastic for women than for men, but
they do not report elasticities. Ransom & Oaxaca (2005) ﬁnd for a chain of grocery
stores that female labor supply to the ﬁrm is less elastic than male labor supply with
elasticities of 2.7 and 3.5, respectively. Both studies rely on Burdett & Mortensen’s
(1998) equilibrium search model with wage posting, where transitions to and from
non-employment are totally wage-inelastic and workers change ﬁrms whenever they
are oﬀered wages above their current wage.
In contrast, we utilize a structural approach resting on methods of survival analysis
proposed by Manning (2003) which avoids these restrictive assumptions by intro-
ducing wage-elastic transitions from and to non-employment as well as stochastic
transitions among employers. Other than Manning (2003) who uses datasets based
on individual- or household-level surveys, we use a large German linked employer-
employee dataset, the LIAB, to take the demand-side into consideration, too. More-
over, by choosing Cox proportional hazard models to model transitions (instead of
exponential hazard models) we avoid specifying duration dependence so that our
approach gains additional ﬂexibility.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy develops a highly stylized version
of Burdett & Mortensen’s (1998) model similar to Manning’s (2003) exposition.
This is enriched in section 3, where our empirical speciﬁcation is derived. Section
4 describes the dataset used, while section 5 presents and discusses our empirical
results. Section 6 draws some conclusions.
2 Theory
In this section we present the structural approach we are going to use when estimat-
ing men’s and women’s labor supply to the ﬁrm. The starting point is a simple model
of dynamic monopsony, where we consider a proﬁt-maximizing, non-discriminating5
monopsonist in discrete time. In the spirit of new monopsony theory, we regard the
ﬁrm as a monopsonist in the sense that it faces an upward-sloping labor supply
curve due to search frictions, heterogenous preferences of workers or mobility costs.1
With this we follow Manning (2003, p. 10) in arguing ‘that labor economics should
adopt a similar attitude to that in industrial organization and start analysis from
the position that all employers have some labor market power’.
Workers are assumed to leave the ﬁrm in consideration in period t at a separation
rate s(wt) ∈ (0,1) which depends negatively on the wage paid by the ﬁrm wt, i.e.
s0 < 0. Total separations in period t are therefore s(wt)Lt−1, where Lt−1 denotes the
ﬁrm’s employment in period t − 1. On the other hand, the ﬂow of recruits R(wt)
arriving at the ﬁrm depends positively on the wage paid, i.e. R0 > 0. Hence, the
labor supply to the ﬁrm in period t depends on wt and Lt−1 and is given by
Lt(wt,Lt−1) = [1 − s(wt)]Lt−1(wt−1,Lt−2) + R(wt). (1)
Given a steady state with Lt(wt,Lt−1) ≡ L(w) and wt ≡ w, ﬁrm’s hires R(w) and
separations s(w)L(w) must be balanced which gives a steady-state workforce of
L(w) = R(w)/s(w) (2)
with L0 > 0 so that steady-state employment depends positively on the ﬁrm’s wage.
Taking logarithms and diﬀerentiation of (2) gives
ε
L
Lw = εRw − εsw (3)
where εL
Lw ≡ L0(w)w/L(w) denotes the long-run wage elasticity of ﬁrm’s labor sup-
ply, εRw ≡ R0(w)w/R(w) the wage elasticity of the ﬂow of recruits and εsw ≡
s0(w)w/s(w) the wage elasticity of the separation rate.
The simple dynamic monopsony framework can be developed further by making use
of the Burdett & Mortensen (1998) model of equilibrium search theory with wage
posting. In order to keep the analysis simple, we closely follow the presentation by
Manning (2003). Suppose there are m homogenous workers and n homogenous ﬁrms,
where we make use of the technical assumption that there exist formally continua of
both. Workers are either employed or unemployed, searching for jobs both on-the-
job and oﬀ-the-job. They receive job oﬀers at an exogenous job oﬀer arrival rate λe
when employed and λu when unemployed. Job oﬀers are drawn at random from the
1 Surveys of monopsony in the labor market are provided by Boal & Ransom (1997) and Bhaskar
et al. (2002).6
wage distribution across employers F(w) with density f(w), where each employer
pays a single wage to all his employees and sets this wage once-for-all to maximize
his steady-state proﬁts (which implies zero time preference of employers). Existing
jobs break oﬀ at a job destruction rate δ which is assumed as exogenous. Let b
denote workers’ opportunity cost of employment, i.e. the utility ﬂow per instant
when unemployed. Workers’ reservation wage wR depends on whether on-the-job or
oﬀ-the-job search is more prospective. If neither on-the-job nor oﬀ-the-job search is
more prospective b also gives workers’ reservation wage, otherwise we have wR ≶ b
if and only if λe ≷ λu (cf. Burdett & Mortensen 1998). Furthermore we assume that
workers’ marginal and average revenue product of labor is constant at p per instant.
Employed workers accept job oﬀers, whenever they are oﬀered wages above their
current wage, while unemployed workers accept every oﬀer.2 In equilibrium, all ﬁrms
must gain the same level of proﬁts π which is given by π = (p − w)L(w|wR,F),
where L(w|wR,F) is the labor supply of a ﬁrm oﬀering wage w given some wage
distribution F and workers’ reservation wage wR, which are explained endogenously.
Now consider the ﬁrm’s separation rate s(w). As existing matches break oﬀ at rate
δ and employed workers receive job oﬀers at rate λe, which they will accept if they
pay more than their current wage, s(w) is given by
s(w) = δ + λe[1 − F(w)]. (4)
The number of recruits R(w) for a ﬁrm paying wage w is represented by




where u denotes the steady-state number of unemployed workers. (5) holds because
unemployed workers receive acceptable job oﬀers at rate λu, whereas only employed
workers earning less than w are willing to accept the ﬁrm’s oﬀer.
Diﬀerentiation of both (4) and (5) and some rearrangement yield
εRw = −εsw ⇐⇒ ε
L
Lw = −2εsw (6)
because we are in a steady state so that (3) applies. Therefore absolute values of
recruitment and separation rate elasticities are the same. Roughly speaking, this
holds since one ﬁrm’s wage-related separation is another ﬁrm’s wage-related hiring
2 This holds as wR is the lower bound of the wage distribution across employers F because all
ﬁrms oﬀering a wage w beyond wR would be unable to recruit any workers at all and would
thus make no proﬁts.7
and since hiring from unemployment as well as separations to unemployment are
totally wage-inelastic. Making use of this result, we are able to estimate the long-
run labor supply elasticity by simply estimating the separation rate elasticity. This
can be done by using existing estimation procedures, such as hazard rate models
(e.g., Campbell 1993), whereas we do not have such procedures for obtaining the
recruitment elasticity.
This speciﬁcation, however, is rather restrictive since it is assumed that workers
change their jobs if and only if they are oﬀered wages above their current wage
and that transitions from and to unemployment are wage-inelastic. In the ﬁrst step,
therefore some stochastic component is introduced by allowing for stochastic transi-
tions among employers. Let ϕ(x/w) denote the probability that a worker currently
paid wage w quits and accepts a job oﬀering wage x. Since ϕ is a probability ϕ ∈ [0,1]
holds. Furthermore assume that ϕ is continuously diﬀerentiable with ϕ0 ≥ 0, i.e. the
probability that a worker changes his job monotonously increases in the ratio of the
oﬀered and the currently paid wage.3 Let w denote the highest wage paid, that is
the maximum of F’s support, and let w denote the lowest wage paid, that is the
minimum of F’s support. Using ϕ as deﬁned above the separation rate of a ﬁrm
paying wage w is given by




Hence, some workers with current wage w might even accept a job oﬀering a wage
x < w. Similarly, the number of recruits for a ﬁrm paying w is represented by











where εsw(w) and εRw(w) indicate that elasticities do not have to be constant for
diﬀerent wages.4 (9) says that absolute values of recruit-weighted recruitment and
separation rate elasticities are the same. In particular this means that for constant
elasticities absolute values of both are the same so that (6) will hold again.
3 Obviously, the model considered so far is nested as a limit case with ϕ(x/w) = 0 if x ≤ w and
ϕ(x/w) = 1 if x > w.
4 A formal proof of this is given by Manning (2003, p. 109).8
While introducing a stochastic component made the transition behavior from em-
ployment at one ﬁrm to employment at another ﬁrm more realistic, transitions from
and to unemployment are still totally wage-inelastic.5 Let se(w) denote the separa-
tion rate to employment, su(w) the separation rate to unemployment and θs(w) the
share of separations to employment which is assumed to vary with the wage paid.








Besides we have se(w) = θs(w)s(w) and su(w) = [1−θs(w)]s(w). Analogously, deﬁne
Re(w) as the number of recruits from employment, Ru(w) as the number of recruits









and Re(w) = θR(w)R(w) as well as Ru(w) = [1 − θR(w)]R(w).
Next, we deﬁne the corresponding elasticities. Let εe
Rw(w) and εu
Rw(w) denote the
wage elasticities of recruits hired from employment and unemployment, and let
εe
sw(w) and εu
sw(w) denote the wage elasticities of the separation rates to employment













This implies that εL
Lw can be estimated by estimating these four elasticities sepa-
rately.
In this case a relationship similar to (9) can be derived. Absolute values of a weighted
average of the separation rate elasticity to employment and a weighted average of
the recruitment elasticity from employment are the same, where the weights are the
number of separations to employment for the former and the number of recruits
5 It might be more adequate to distinguish employment and non-employment instead of em-
ployment and unemployment. However, due to the nature of the data we are going to use we
cannot identify transitions to or from non-employment (other than unemployment) so that
we will, unlike Manning (2003), model transitions to and from unemployment instead.9













so that both elasticities will be the same in absolute values if both are constant. In
this case (13) can be used to obtain an estimate for εe
Rw from the estimate of εe
sw. In
case of non-constant elasticities, however, we would be confronted with the problem
of obtaining the weights of the averages.
What is left is ﬁnding a procedure to estimate εu
Rw. Consider that the share of



















Therefore we may use this relationship to estimate εu
Rw indirectly through εe
Rw so
that we do not have to estimate recruitment elasticities at all.
To sum up, the relationships in equations (12), (13) and (15) enable us to apply
the following procedure for identifying the labor supply elasticity: In the ﬁrst step,
we have to estimate the separation rate elasticity to employment εe
sw, which also
provides, in the second step, an estimate of the recruitment elasticity to employment
εe
Rw. Third, we have to estimate the separation rate elasticity to unemployment εu
sw.
Fourth, this estimate can be used to obtain an estimate of the recruitment elasticity
from unemployment εu
Rw. Finally, these four estimates can be combined to obtain
an estimate for the long-run elasticity of labor supply to the ﬁrm.
3 Empirical Speciﬁcation
The results presented in section 2 can now be used to estimate the long-run la-
bor supply elasticity. Suppose there are m workers with N employment spells,
indexed by i = 1,...,N, who work for n ﬁrms, indexed by j = 1,...,n. Let
xi ≡ (xi1,...,xik) denote a vector of k covariates observed for employment spell
6 A formal proof of this is given by Manning (2003, pp. 109/10).10
i. Next let β ≡ (β1,...,βk)0 ∈ Rk denote a vector of k coeﬃcients which are the
same for all spells i = 1,...,N. Analogously, zj(i) ≡ (zj(i)1,...,zj(i)l) is a vector
of l covariates observed for ﬁrm j(i) for which the worker with spell i is working.
Eventually γ ≡ (γ1,...,γl)0 ∈ Rl denotes the corresponding vector of l coeﬃcients.
Now we model the instantaneous separation rate to employment of the i-th spell at








This gives a conditional hazard function with baseline hazard σe
0(t), i.e. a Cox pro-
portional hazard model.7 Next, we model the instantaneous separation rate to un-
employment in the same manner as
σ
u





Contrary to (16) and (17), Manning (2003) models instantaneous separation rates
as exponential functions and ﬁts an exponential hazard model. Assuming that these
instantaneous separation rates are independent, Manning (2003, p. 101) shows that
they can be estimated stepwise: Two estimations are done, each of them considering
two states so that one has not to deal with competing risk models. The separation
rate to unemployment is estimated using the whole sample, where transitions to
unemployment and stayers are distinguished. The separation rate to employment is
estimated using the sample of those employment spells not ending with a transi-
tion from employment to unemployment. In this case transitions to other ﬁrms and
stayers are distinguished.
Although such a two-step procedure is also employed here, our approach of modeling
the separation rates according to (16) and (17) is less restrictive. An exponential
model such as Manning’s assumes that there is no duration dependence, i.e. the
conditional hazard function is constant over time. By contrast, our model allows for
duration dependence, both positive and negative, as the baseline hazard is allowed
to vary over time. The coeﬃcient vectors in (16) and (17) can now be estimated
using Cox’ (1972, 1975) partial likelihood estimator without specifying the baseline
hazard and, thus, without specifying duration dependence.
If xi includes spell i’s log wage lnwi, the wage elasticities of the instantaneous
separation rates are constant for all xi and zj(i) and are obtained from (16) and (17)
7 For details about hazard rate models and particularly the Cox proportional hazard model see
Klein & Moeschberger (2003).11













w (ν ∈ {e,u}), (18)
where βν
w is the corresponding coeﬃcient of log wage. Making use of (18) the estimate
ˆ βe
w gives an approximate estimate for the separation rate elasticity to employment
ˆ εe
sw, while the estimate of βu
w gives an approximate estimate for the separation rate
elasticity to unemployment ˆ εu
sw. Since the Cox proportional hazard models estimate
constant separation rate elasticities, (13) says that absolute values of the separation
rate elasticity to employment and the recruitment elasticity from employment are
the same so that the estimate ˆ εe
sw provides also an estimate of εe
Rw. Thus, we do not
have to estimate εe
Rw on its own.
Finally, we model the share of recruits hired from employment θR as a standard
logistic function, where now i = 1,..., ˜ N transitions of ˜ m recruits are considered.
Hence, the probability that a recruit comes from employment Pr(yi = 1) becomes
Pr(yi = 1) = θR,i(xi,zj(i)) ≡
exp(xiβ + zj(i)γ)
1 + exp(xiβ + zj(i)γ)
, (19)
where notation follows the same rules as before and yi is a binary response taking on
the value one if a recruit comes from employment and zero otherwise. If xi includes






Since the estimated ˆ βw is the same for all spells i = 1,..., ˜ m we may drop the index
i and (20) becomes exactly the second term on the right-hand side of (15). Therefore
we can obtain ˆ εu
Rw from ˆ εe
Rw by subtracting ˆ βw from the latter. To get an estimate for
βw we ﬁt a logit model for the probability that a recruit is hired from employment
since a logit model uses a standard logistic link function.
In steady state the share of recruits from employment and the share of separations to
employment must be the same so that we deﬁne θ ≡ θR = θs. To obtain an estimate
of εL
Lw making use of (12) we need to calculate θ. Then we are able to estimate the
long-run elasticity of ﬁrm’s labor supply as
ˆ ε
L
Lw = θˆ ε
e
Rw + (1 − θ)ˆ ε
u
Rw − θˆ ε
e
sw − (1 − θ)ˆ ε
u
sw
= −(1 + θ)ˆ β
e
w − (1 − θ)(ˆ β
u
w + ˆ βw).
(21)12
Manning (2003, pp. 100–5) uses this procedure to estimate labor supply elasticities
for two American and two British datasets: the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and
the National Longitudinal Study of the Youth from the U.S. as well as the Labour
Force Survey and the British Household Panel Study from the UK. He ﬁts exponen-
tial hazard models and does not estimate elasticities separately for men and women.
Furthermore he uses datasets based on supply-side individual- or household-level
surveys so that he is not able to control adequately for ﬁrm-speciﬁc determinants
of transition behavior. For all four datasets estimated separation rate elasticities
are negative, low in absolute value and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The
resulting long-run labor supply elasticities are quite low, ranging from 0.59 to 1.38.
Ransom & Oaxaca (2005) do analyze elasticities for men and women, but they use
the restrictive speciﬁcation with deterministic transition behavior across ﬁrms and
totally wage-inelastic transitions from and to non-employment so that (6) applies.
Using data from a chain of regional grocery stores from the U.S. they ﬁt a probit
model for the probability that a separation takes place. Again no ﬁrm-speciﬁc con-
trols are added. Estimated supply elasticities, evaluated at the sample mean of the
explanatory variables, are around 3.5 for male and around 2.7 for female workers
(depending on speciﬁcation), implying that ﬁrms have signiﬁcant monopsony power.
Moreover the noticeable diﬀerence in elasticities could give employers the opportu-
nity of engaging Robinsonian wage discrimination which would mean that the more
wage-elastic group, i.e. male workers, earns more ceteris paribus. Furthermore, using
a Norwegian linked employer-employee dataset, Barth & Dale-Olsen (1999) present
some evidence that female turnover is less wage-elastic, but they do not report elas-
ticities.
4 Data
The dataset used in subsequent empirical analyses is the German LIAB, i.e. the
Linked Employer-Employee Dataset of the Institute for Employment Research (In-
stitut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB) of the German Federal Employ-
ment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). More precisely, we will use version 2 of
the LIAB longitudinal model and restrict our analyses to the year 2000 and western
Germany.8 The LIAB is created by linking the process-produced person-speciﬁc data
8 There are two reasons for this restriction. Firstly, the structural approach we make use of
assumes steady-state conditions. These are more likely to be found in western Germany than
in eastern Germany that still experiences the long transition from a socialist to a capitalist
economy. Secondly, unobserved heterogeneity is likely to cause a downward bias of the es-13
of the IAB with the IAB Establishment Panel (cf. Alda et al. 2005). Using the LIAB
we are therefore able to control both for personal and establishment characteristics.
The employee history used for constructing the LIAB is based on the integrated
notiﬁcation procedure for the health, pension and unemployment insurances.9 This
procedure requires all employers to report all information of their employees if cov-
ered by the social security system, where misreporting is legally sanctioned. No-
tiﬁcations are compulsory at the beginning as well as at the end of employment.
Additionally, an annual report must be made for each employee employed on De-
cember 31 of the year. As a consequence, only those workers, salaried employees and
trainees who are covered by social security are included. Thus, among others, civil
servants, self-employed, those in marginal employment, students enrolled in higher
education and family workers are not included. All in all, approximately 80% of all
people employed in western Germany are part of the employee history.
The data include, among others things, information for every employee on daily
gross wage, censored at the social security contribution ceiling, on the employee’s
occupation and occupational status, on industry and on the start and end of each
employee notiﬁcation. Furthermore individual characteristics, such as age, schooling
and training as well as nationality are contained.10 Finally, an establishment number
is included which is used to link the employee history and the IAB Establishment
Panel.
The employer side of our dataset is given by the IAB Establishment Panel, a ran-
dom sample of establishments (not companies) from the comprehensive Employment
Statistics drawn according to the principle of optimal stratiﬁcation.11 Strata are de-
ﬁned over plant sizes and industries, where all in all 16 industries and ten ﬁrm sizes
are considered. Since the survey is based on the Employment Statistics aggregated
via the establishment number as of June 30 of a year it only includes establishments
which employ at least one employee covered by social security. Every year since 1993
(1996) the IAB Establishment Panel has surveyed the same establishments from all
industries in western (eastern) Germany. Response rates of units which have been in-
terviewed repeatedly exceed 80%. The IAB Establishment Panel is created to serve
timated separation rate elasticities (cf. Lancaster 1990, p. 304). Manning (2003, pp. 103/4)
demonstrates that the bias is likely to be reduced markedly as the time period in consideration
becomes shorter and concludes that the bias is likely to be small for a one year time horizon.
9 Details are given by Alda et al. (2005) and Bender et al. (2000).
10 Due to notiﬁcations made in the case of changes which are relevant according to beneﬁt
entitlement rules there is also information on the person’s marital status and the number of
children. However, these variables contain much measurement error and are very fragmentary
(cf. Alda 2005, p. 21) so that we will not make use of them.
11 Details about the IAB Establishment Panel are given by Kölling (2000).14
the needs of the Federal Employment Agency so that the focus on employment-
related topics is predominant. Questions deal, among other things, with the number
of employees, the working week for full-time workers, overtime, the establishment’s
commitment to collective agreements, the existence of a works council, the estab-
lishment’s performance and export share, the technological status of the industrial
plant and the establishment size.
Linking both the IAB Establishment Panel and the employee history through the
establishment number gives the LIAB.12 In version 2 of the LIAB longitudinal model,
used in the following analyses, employment and beneﬁt notiﬁcations of people are
provided for the years 1993 to 2003. Information on establishments is taken from the
IAB Establishment Panel, where the number of panel establishments is limited to a
selection to keep the dataset manageable. All in all, about 28.5 million notiﬁcations of
2.36 million employees and 5,300 establishments are included for western Germany.13
Version 2 of the LIAB longitudinal model enables us to use the available ﬂow infor-
mation of individuals to analyze the separation rates as discussed in section 3, viz.
the separation rates to unemployment and employment, where employment refers
to employment at another establishment. Due to inclusion of establishment data we
are able to control as well for person-speciﬁc characteristics as for characteristics of
the establishment the employee is working for or is entering. Therefore the labor
market’s demand- and supply-sides can be taken into consideration.
There are, however, some shortcomings due to the nature of the data. We are only
able to consider transitions from employment to employment at another establish-
ment and from employment to unemployment. Transitions from employment to non-
employment outside unemployment cannot be analyzed. The reason is that the data
do not indicate whether employees without further notiﬁcations have changed to
non-employment without receiving beneﬁts (that is without being registered as un-
employed) or have become, for instance, civil servants or self-employed who are not
included in the employee history.
Another shortcoming of the LIAB is that daily gross wages are censored at the
social security contribution ceiling, viz. e143.92 in 2000. Obviously, using wage
data without any correction would give biased estimates. One way to deal with this
12 Details about the diﬀerent LIAB models and their versions are given by Alda (2005).
13 Since there is no detailed information on the number of hours worked, we exclude part-time
employees and concentrate on full-time employees. Moreover, apprentices and a small number
of employees experiencing recalls are excluded. Finally, notiﬁcations which start and end at
the same day and beneﬁt notiﬁcations which correspond to employment notiﬁcations at the
same time are deleted.15
problem is single imputation, i.e. imputing all censored wages with estimated wages.
Assuming that daily gross wages have a log-normal distribution, which seems to be
a plausible approximation, ﬁrst a Tobit model is estimated, where the dependent
variable is log daily gross wage and the independent variables are those included
in further analyses. Then for every censored observation a random value is drawn
from a normal distribution left-truncated at the social security contribution ceiling
(with predicted log wage as mean, and standard deviation as estimated from the
Tobit model).14 To avoid biased estimates this procedure is applied to log daily
gross wages in all analyses to follow.
5 Results
Now we apply the structural estimation procedure developed in sections 2 and 3
to estimate the long-run wage elasticity of ﬁrm’s female and male labor supplies.
We ﬁt Cox proportional hazard models for the instantaneous separation rates to
employment and unemployment to obtain the corresponding separation rate elastic-
ities (see, e.g., Klein & Moeschberger 2003, ch. 8). We further estimate a logit model
for the probability that a recruit is hired from employment, where the estimated
coeﬃcient for the log wage links the separation rate elasticity to employment and
the recruitment elasticity from unemployment. All these estimates are done both
without and with establishment controls.
Transition to employment. First of all we have to estimate the separation rate
elasticity to employment. This is done by ﬁtting a Cox proportional hazard model for
the instantaneous separation rate to employment, using a sample of 256,238 employ-
ment spells at IAB Panel establishments, 17,486 of them ending with a transition to
another establishment. Note that only those employment spells are considered which
do not end in unemployment so that there are only spells ending with a transition
to another establishment or spells being censored without such a transition.
First we include only person-speciﬁc controls (model 1a). The eﬀect we are mainly
interested in is the eﬀect of the wage on the separation rate to employment, so
log daily gross wage is included as an explanatory variable. Theory implies that
this eﬀect should be negative: The higher the wages paid, the lower should be the
separation rate. To investigate the diﬀerence between men and women in wage-
related transition behavior we include both a dummy variable indicating whether
14 For details on single imputation in the case of censored wages see Gartner (2005).16
the worker is male and an interaction term interacting the dummy variable with log
daily gross wage. Since we argue that monopsonistic wage discrimination could be
part of the explanation of the gender pay gap we expect women to be less wage-
elastic so that the interaction term should be negative.
There are several other variables which may inﬂuence the separation rate to employ-
ment so that controlling for these factors is necessary to get a reliable estimate for the
separation rate elasticity of men and women. For instance, the transition behavior
of German and non-German workers may diﬀer. Next, the worker’s age is related to
his working experience and, thus, it is likely to reﬂect diﬀerences in general training
and, consequently, in productivity due to job experience. Therefore poaching of ex-
perienced workers should be more frequent so that the instantaneous separation rate
to employment should increase in age. Furthermore we expect investments in human
capital to decline in age as the end of working life approaches. Hence, the impact of
squared age should be negative. A similar story applies to worker’s formal education.
We distinguish six diﬀerent groups: workers with neither apprenticeship nor Abitur
(which is the German equivalent to A-levels or graduation from high school), those
with only apprenticeship, those with only Abitur, those with both, workers with a
technical college degree, and ﬁnally those with a university degree. Since we expect
higher degrees of formal education to reﬂect higher productivity both in terms of
signaling productivity and of higher investments in human capital, poaching should
be more frequent for workers with higher formal education. Hence, their separation
rate should be higher. By the same token, occupations which need more skilled work-
ers should exhibit more poaching and should therefore have a higher separation rate
to employment. We distinguish eleven groups of occupations: basic and qualiﬁed
manual occupations, engineers/technicians, basic and qualiﬁed service occupations,
semi-professionals and professionals, basic and qualiﬁed business occupations and,
eventually, managers.15
Estimation results for this model 1a are reported in table 1. As expected, women
are less wage-elastic than men, their elasticity being estimated only as −0.813 com-
pared to −1.353 for men, where the diﬀerence represented by the interaction term
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. All in all, controls have the signs implied
by theory. The estimated coeﬃcient of age is signiﬁcantly positive, the sign of the
15 One might also argue that tenure could inﬂuence the separation rate. However, one of the
main theses of the new monopsony literature is that paying higher wages reduces separations
and thus raises tenure so that excluding tenure may give better estimates (cf. Manning 2003,
p. 103). Furthermore, version 2 of the LIAB longitudinal model up to now includes no reliable
tenure variable so that we could not have controlled for tenure adequately even if we had
wanted to.17
Table 1: Estimations without establishment controlsa








Log daily gross wage (in e) −0.813∗∗ (0.189) −1.705∗∗ (0.094) 1.645∗∗ (0.152)
Male (dummy: 1 = yes) 2.823∗∗ (0.555) 2.148∗∗ (0.559) 0.367 (0.593)
Male × log daily gross wage (interaction term) −0.540∗∗ (0.128) −0.431∗∗ (0.135) −0.087 (0.139)
Age (in years) 0.091∗∗ (0.013) −0.030 (0.030) 0.021 (0.016)
Age2/100 −0.164∗∗ (0.020) 0.034 (0.040) −0.068∗∗ (0.023)
Non-German (dummy: 1 = yes) −0.140 (0.072) 0.168 (0.097) −0.008 (0.106)
Without apprenticeship or Abitur (ref. group) — — —
Apprenticeship, no Abitur (dummy: 1 = yes) −0.179∗ (0.073) −0.260∗∗ (0.088) 0.170∗ (0.081)
No apprenticeship, with Abitur (dummy: 1 = yes) −0.108 (0.196) −1.918∗∗ (0.568) 1.219∗∗ (0.266)
Apprenticeship and Abitur (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.112 (0.078) −0.476∗∗ (0.120) 0.410∗∗ (0.120)
Technical college degree (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.355∗ (0.151) −0.106 (0.117) 0.446∗∗ (0.125)
University degree (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.573∗∗ (0.155) −0.065 (0.126) 0.201 (0.154)
Basic manual occupation (ref. group) — — —
Qualiﬁed manual occupation (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.194 (0.128) −0.344∗∗ (0.085) 0.319∗∗ (0.101)
Engineers and technicians (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.515∗∗ (0.105) −0.432∗∗ (0.142) 0.569∗∗ (0.145)
Basic service occupation (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.195 (0.118) −0.329∗∗ (0.101) 0.436∗∗ (0.123)
Qualiﬁed service occupation (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.179 (0.156) −0.432∗ (0.187) 0.371 (0.194)
Semi-professional (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.365∗∗ (0.118) −0.277 (0.175) −0.024 (0.144)
Professional (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.715∗∗ (0.131) 0.164 (0.192) 0.345∗ (0.165)
Basic business occupation (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.682∗∗ (0.118) −0.259∗ (0.120) 0.428∗∗ (0.140)
Qualiﬁed business occupation (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.637∗∗ (0.207) −0.521∗∗ (0.120) 0.423∗∗ (0.107)
Manager (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.944∗∗ (0.115) 0.116 (0.160) 0.631∗∗ (0.157)
Constant — — −6.839∗∗ (0.664)
Observations 256,238 266,792 30,481
Transitions 17,486 10,554 30,481
Log likelihood −207,219 −123,404 −18,200
McFadden-R2 0.0201 0.0356 0.1030
Notes:
a The dataset used is version 2 of the LIAB longitudinal model. Robust standard errors adjusted for intra-
establishment correlations are given in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance: ∗∗ at the 1% level
and ∗ at the 5% level.
b The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value one if the individual changes from an IAB Panel
establishment to another establishment and zero otherwise. Only spells ending or beginning in 2000 which do
not end with transition to unemployment are considered. A Cox proportional hazard model is ﬁtted using partial
likelihood.
c The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value one if the individual changes from an IAB Panel
establishment into unemployment and zero otherwise. Only spells ending or beginning in 2000 are considered. A
Cox proportional hazard model is ﬁtted using partial likelihood.
d The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value one if the recruit of an IAB Panel establishment
comes from employment and zero otherwise. Only transitions in 2000 are considered. A logit model is ﬁtted
using maximum likelihood.18
coeﬃcient of squared age is signiﬁcantly negative. Workers with higher formal edu-
cation and in occupations requiring more skills tend to have higher separation rates.
Separation rates do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly for non-German workers.
In a next step we include establishment controls which gives model 1b, estimates of
which are reported in table 2. We now take into account that separation rates for
workers of establishments belonging to diﬀerent sectors may diﬀer. Hence, we include
ten sectoral dummies.16 Since workers of diﬀerent qualiﬁcation as well as male and
female workers diﬀer in transition behavior it is likely that working for establishments
with diﬀerent proportions of qualiﬁed and female workers in the workforce makes a
diﬀerence. Therefore we include the shares of qualiﬁed and female workers. Following
the collective voice argument given by Freeman & Medoﬀ (1984), the representation
of workers’ interests either by a works council of by a union (via collective agreements
at sectoral or ﬁrm level) may improve morale and thus reduce the separation rate
to employment. Furthermore the existence of an occupational pension scheme might
reduce the separation rate for those workers who would lose their contributions when
quitting. Finally, we expect the separation rate to be lower in establishments with
good economic performance and new production technology as these establishments
may be more attractive employers.17
As an (unreported) likelihood ratio test reveals, model 1b ﬁts the data signiﬁcantly
better. The establishment controls usually have the expected signs, although most of
them are not signiﬁcant. Only the proportion of female workers has a signiﬁcantly
positive impact on the separation rate, whereas the existence of a works council
signiﬁcantly reduces the separation rate. Industry aﬃliation and occupational vari-
ables also play a role. Adding establishment characteristics to the models reduces the
estimated separation elasticities, whereas the size of the diﬀerence between female
and male workers is nearly unchanged and remains statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% level. With an elasticity of −0.569, women are still less wage-elastic than men
whose elasticity is estimated as −1.070.
16 Sectors are (1) agriculture, hunting and forestry (including ﬁshing), (2) mining, quarrying,
electricity, gas and water supply, (3) manufacturing, (4) trade and repair, (5) construction,
(6) transport, storage and communication, (7) ﬁnancial intermediation, (8) business activities,
(9) other activities and, ﬁnally, (10) non-proﬁt organizations and public administration.
17 One might expect that establishment size, i.e. the total number of employees, is another in-
ﬂuential variable. However, models of monopsony, such as the Burdett & Mortensen (1998)
model, imply that establishment size can (only) be extended by paying higher wages so that
establishment size variables should be insigniﬁcant. In order to check this hypothesis we added
establishment size and its square to models 1b, 2b and 3b. As expected, variables were in-
signiﬁcant in all estimations, as well on their own as jointly.19
Transition to unemployment. After estimating the separation rate elasticity to
employment we now turn to the separation rate elasticity to unemployment. Com-
pletely analogously, estimation is done by ﬁtting a Cox proportional hazard model
for the instantaneous separation rate to unemployment. The following estimates use
a sample of 266,792 employment spells at IAB Panel establishments, where 10,554
transitions to unemployment take place. Spells ending with a transition from an
IAB Panel establishment to another establishment are included as censored since no
transition to unemployment takes place.
Again, we begin with including only person-speciﬁc controls (model 2a). Since we
are now interested in the (instantaneous) separation rate to unemployment, the ar-
guments considered for model 1b suggest that age should have a negative impact,
whereas its square should have a positive eﬀect on the separation rate to unemploy-
ment. By the same token, the separation rate should be lower for those workers which
have more formal education and those in occupations which require more skills. We
expect establishments to lay oﬀ more skilled (i.e. more productive) employees less
often than less skilled workers.
As can be seen from table 1, estimated coeﬃcients tend to have the expected signs
and they are for the most part signiﬁcant. Only professionals and managers have the
‘wrong’ sign for the sample considered, although estimated coeﬃcients are insignif-
icant. Moreover, workers with technical college or university degrees do not have
signiﬁcantly lower separation rates to unemployment compared to apparently less
skilled workers without apprenticeship or Abitur. The estimated separation rate elas-
ticities of men and women diﬀer signiﬁcantly at the 1% level, with women’s transi-
tions to unemployment being less wage-elastic than men’s with estimated elasticities
of −1.705 and −2.136, respectively.
Including the same establishment controls as in model 1b gives model 2b. Again, ten
sectoral dummies are included because establishments belonging to diﬀerent sectors
may diﬀer in layoﬀ behavior. Since we found in model 2a that separation rates diﬀer
by qualiﬁcation and sex we include the proportions of female and qualiﬁed work-
ers in the workforce because establishments with diﬀerent shares of these groups
may diﬀer in layoﬀ behavior as well. The existence of a works council or of collective
agreements at sectoral or ﬁrm level may reduce the separation rate to unemployment
as establishments may ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to lay oﬀ employees. Finally, establish-
ments with a good economic performance should lay oﬀ workers less often so that
the separation rate should be lower. In our eyes, the eﬀect of new production tech-20
Table 2: Estimations with establishment controlsa








Log daily gross wage (in e) −0.569∗∗ (0.141) −1.646∗∗ (0.094) 1.584∗∗ (0.135)
Male (dummy: 1 = yes) 2.629∗∗ (0.495) 1.658∗∗ (0.582) 0.813 (0.566)
Male × log wage (interaction term) −0.501∗∗ (0.112) −0.337∗ (0.137) −0.180 (0.133)
Age (in years) 0.081∗∗ (0.012) −0.037 (0.029) 0.020 (0.016)
Age2/100 −0.150∗∗ (0.018) 0.040 (0.037) −0.061∗∗ (0.022)
Non-German (dummy: 1 = yes) −0.158∗ (0.065) 0.178 (0.096) −0.055 (0.097)
Without apprenticeship or Abitur (ref. group) — — —
Apprenticeship, no Abitur (dummy: 1 = yes) −0.167∗∗ (0.062) −0.242∗∗ (0.075) 0.136 (0.074)
No apprenticeship, with Abitur (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.145 (0.132) −1.505∗∗ (0.471) 1.117∗∗ (0.262)
Apprenticeship and Abitur (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.068 (0.112) −0.353∗∗ (0.113) 0.311∗∗ (0.118)
Technical college degree (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.377∗∗ (0.128) −0.071 (0.110) 0.407∗∗ (0.120)
University degree (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.525∗∗ (0.156) 0.023 (0.110) 0.141 (0.143)
Basic manual occupation (ref. group) — — —
Qualiﬁed manual occupation (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.139 (0.121) −0.315∗∗ (0.088) 0.266∗∗ (0.101)
Engineers and technicians (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.381∗∗ (0.107) −0.410∗∗ (0.147) 0.539∗∗ (0.142)
Basic service occupation (dummy: 1 = yes) −0.011 (0.114) −0.281∗∗ (0.086) 0.421∗∗ (0.128)
Qualiﬁed service occupation (dummy: 1 = yes) −0.049 (0.193) −0.263 (0.188) 0.488∗ (0.192)
Semi-professional (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.339∗ (0.147) −0.164 (0.166) 0.198 (0.165)
Professional (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.591∗∗ (0.134) 0.229 (0.194) 0.523∗∗ (0.182)
Basic business occupation (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.438∗∗ (0.110) −0.135 (0.106) 0.278 (0.143)
Qualiﬁed business occupation (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.405∗∗ (0.090) −0.396∗∗ (0.108) 0.331∗∗ (0.104)
Manager (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.667∗∗ (0.127) 0.201 (0.148) 0.603∗∗ (0.160)
Coll. agreement at sect. level (dummy: 1 = yes) −0.064 (0.081) 0.077 (0.105) −0.072 (0.099)
Coll. agreement at ﬁrm level (dummy: 1 = yes) −0.052 (0.224) −0.248 (0.219) −0.008 (0.163)
Works council (dummy: 1 = yes) −0.331∗∗ (0.093) −0.147 (0.115) 0.230∗ (0.101)
Proportion of female workers 0.478∗ (0.209) −0.469∗ (0.231) 0.387 (0.225)
Proportion of qualiﬁed workers −0.082 (0.221) −0.323 (0.251) 0.293 (0.187)
Occupational pension scheme (dummy: 1 = yes) −0.221 (0.123) −0.077 (0.091) 0.003 (0.079)
Good economic performance (dummy: 1 = yes) −0.281 (0.205) −0.321∗ (0.140) 0.133 (0.097)
New production technology (dummy: 1 = yes) −0.039 (0.131) −0.019 (0.098) 0.094 (0.094)
Ten sectoral dummiese [0.0000]∗∗ [0.0079]∗∗ [0.0000]∗∗
Constant — — −8.747∗∗ (0.633)
Observations 256,238 266,792 30,481
Transitions 17,486 10,554 30,481
Log likelihood −205,858 −123,050 −17,967
McFadden-R2 0.0265 0.0384 0.1145
Notes:
a The dataset used is version 2 of the LIAB longitudinal model. Robust standard errors adjusted for intra-
establishment correlations are given in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance: ∗∗ at the 1% level
and ∗ at the 5% level.
b The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value one if the individual changes from an IAB Panel
establishment to another establishment and zero otherwise. Only spells ending or beginning in 2000 which do
not end with transition to unemployment are considered. A Cox proportional hazard model is ﬁtted using partial
likelihood.
c The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value one if the individual changes from an IAB Panel
establishment into unemployment and zero otherwise. Only spells ending or beginning in 2000 are considered. A
Cox proportional hazard model is ﬁtted using partial likelihood.
d The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value one if the recruit of an IAB Panel establishment
comes from employment and zero otherwise. Only transitions in 2000 are considered. A logit model is ﬁtted
using maximum likelihood.
e The joint statistical signiﬁcance of the sectoral dummy variables is tested by performing a Wald test. The
resulting p-value is reported in squared brackets.21
nology and of an occupational pension scheme is unclear. Nonetheless, these control
variables are included to guarantee estimates’ comparability across models.
Performing a likelihood ratio test (not reported here), we ﬁnd that model 2b ﬁts
the data evidently better. Most establishment controls, however, are insigniﬁcant
(even though most of them have the ‘right’ sign). The impact of person-speciﬁc
controls is not changed. The sectoral dummies are jointly signiﬁcant at the 1%
level so that there are diﬀerences among sectors. As expected, ﬁrms with a good
economic performance have signiﬁcantly lower separation rates to unemployment.
The estimated separation rate elasticity to unemployment is still signiﬁcantly higher
for men than for women. The diﬀerence in elasticities, however, is reduced with
elasticities estimated as −1.646 for women and −1.983 for men.
Hiring from employment. Finally, we have to ﬁt a logit model for the probability
that a recruit comes from employment, where the estimated coeﬃcient of log wage
links the separation rate elasticity to employment and the recruitment elasticity
from unemployment. The following estimates use data of 30,481 recruits of IAB
Panel establishments, where 18,797 of them are hired from employment and 11,684
from unemployment. First we include person-speciﬁc variables (model 3a).
We expect the probability that a recruit comes from employment and thus the share
of recruits from employment to rise with the wage oﬀered. That is to say that high-
wage ﬁrms poach more eﬀectively which is what theory predicts. One implication
of this is that the recruitment elasticity from employment is higher than that from
unemployment (cf. Manning 2003, p. 104). Furthermore, we expect that young and
old workers are more often recruited from unemployment. The reason is that these
groups are, for the same arguments given above, likely to have less human capital
than middle-aged workers so that we expect less poaching for them. Put diﬀerently,
competition among employers for these groups should be less intense. The same
argument applies to workers’ formal education and occupation. Workers with more
formal education and workers in occupations requiring more skills should less often
be hired from unemployment. By and large, the estimates of model 3a presented
in table 1 conﬁrm these expectations. The estimated coeﬃcients of log daily gross
wage for female and male recruits are 1.645 and 1.558, respectively. This diﬀerence,
reﬂected by the estimated interaction term, however, is not statistically signiﬁcant
at conventional levels.
In model 3b all the establishment controls from models 1b and 2b are included. Ten
sectoral dummies control for diﬀerences among sectors since we expect establish-22
ments of diﬀerent sectors to resort diﬀerently to unemployed workers. On account of
asymmetric information on workers’ productivity ﬁrms are likely to prefer recruiting
from employment (through poaching). We therefore expect that establishments with
a high share of qualiﬁed workers and new production technology recruit unemployed
persons more infrequently. Since works councils and union collective agreements usu-
ally try to protect the insiders in a ﬁrm, their existence could be associated with
a negative eﬀect on the probability that a recruit is hired from unemployment. We
also include the proportion of female workers in the workforce because the impact
of gender is our main focus. Although the impact of good economic performance is
unclear, we include this variable in order to guarantee comparability between the
estimations done before and those here.
The results reported in table 2 show that there are noticeable diﬀerences among
sectors and that the existence of a works council has a signiﬁcantly positive impact
on the hiring probability. The estimated coeﬃcient of log daily wage reduces slightly
compared to model 3a, while the diﬀerence between female and male workers is
still statistically insigniﬁcant at conventional levels and small in size with estimated
coeﬃcients of 1.548 and 1.404, respectively.
Obtaining Estimates for Labor Supply Elasticities. Combining these results
we can now use equation (21) to obtain estimates for the long-run wage elasticity of
ﬁrms’ labor supply separately for female and male workers. Table 3 presents the re-
sults when using models 1a, 2a and 3a, i.e. without establishment controls, or using
alternatively models 1b, 2b and 3b, i.e. with establishment controls. The share of
recruits from employment is obtained by calculating the sample average. In a steady
state, assumed here, the share of recruits from employment must be equal to the
share of separations to employment. As there are 17,486 separations to employment
compared to 18,797 recruits hired from employment this seems to be a rather plausi-
ble assumption. Actually, the shares of separations to employment and recruits from
employment for all workers deviate only slightly, viz. 0.623 compared to 0.617. We
shall use the share of recruits from employment in the following calculations.
Table 3 makes clear that labor supply elasticities are rather low and that there are
substantial diﬀerences between male and female workers. While there is consensus
that female labor supply is more elastic than male labor supply in terms of market
supply (see, e.g., Cahuc & Zylberberg 2004, p. 38), we ﬁnd that female labor supply
to the ﬁrm is less elastic than the labor supply of men. The estimated elasticity of
women is, roughly speaking, only half the size of men’s: 1.325 compared to 2.415 with23














Estimated wage elasticity of the
separation rate to employment (ˆ βe
w)
−1.353 −0.813 −1.070 −0.569
Estimated wage elasticity of the
separation rate to unemployment (ˆ βu
w)
−2.136 −1.705 −1.983 −1.646
Estimated coeﬃcient on log wage in a
logit model for the probability that a
recruit comes from employment (ˆ βw)
1.558 1.645 1.404 1.584
Share of recruits from employment (θ) 0.624 0.599 0.624 0.599
Estimated wage elasticity of ﬁrm’s
labor supplyb
2.415 1.325 1.956 0.935
Notes:
a Estimated coeﬃcients are taken from tables 1 and 2. Coeﬃcients for men are gained by adding
the corresponding interaction term to the coeﬃcient of the reference group. Deviations are
due to rounding diﬀerences.
b Estimated wage elasticities of ﬁrms’ labor supply are obtained according to equation (21).
person-speciﬁc controls and 0.935 compared to 1.956 when establishment controls
are included, too.18
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated women’s and men’s labor supply to the ﬁrm. We
estimated labor supply elasticities within a structural approach resting on a dynamic
model of new monopsony based on the Burdett & Mortensen (1998) model. Unlike
Burdett & Mortensen (1998), we allowed for stochastic transitions between ﬁrms and
wage-elastic transitions from and to unemployment, in such a way following Manning
(2003). Estimations were carried out by methods of survival analysis, and we made
use of the German linked employer-employee dataset LIAB for the year 2000. All in
all, estimated elasticities were found to be small (between 0.9 and 2.4, depending on
speciﬁcation), and women’s elasticity is only about half the size of men’s. Although
18 In order to investigate the results’ robustness all the estimates were repeated for the year
2002 (results are available on request). Estimated supply elasticities for 2002 are even a little
smaller than for the year 2000. Though there are minor changes in detail, women’s labor
supply remains substantially less elastic than men’s.24
we have not been able to test for the structural approach chosen and although data
restrictions did not allow us to investigate transitions to non-employment (rather
than unemployment), our results should enable us to draw some cautious conclusions
concerning the relevance and implications of gender diﬀerences in labor supply to
the ﬁrm.
One important general insight is that estimated labor supply elasticities are far from
the conventional textbook case of being totally elastic. This implies that the new
monopsony approach is not rejected by the data, for its main feature is upward-
sloping labor supply to the ﬁrm. Since the estimated elasticities are rather small in
size, new monopsony models would suggest that ﬁrms have substantial monopsony
power.
Conﬁrming a presumption by Boal & Ransom (1997), we found that (in contrast to
labor supply at the level of the market) labor supply to the ﬁrm is less elastic for
women than for men. Since this means that women’s labor supply curve to the ﬁrm is
steeper than men’s, our ﬁndings are consistent with those of Green et al. (1996) who
report larger employer size-wage eﬀects for women than for men. Furthermore, our
results conﬁrm and extend the two other attempts made to investigate women’s and
men’s labor supply elasticities, namely the studies of Ransom & Oaxaca (2005) and
Barth & Dale-Olsen (1999), since our analysis is built on less restrictive assumptions
and explicitly controls for ﬁrm characteristics.
The substantial gender diﬀerence in labor supply elasticities found might give rise
to wage discrimination in the spirit of Robinson (1933, p. 224), who argued that
‘[j]ust as we have price discrimination for a monopolist, so we may have price dis-
crimination for a monopsonist.’ This would result in lower wages for women, ceteris
paribus, as a long-run equilibrium outcome since they are the less wage-elastic group.
Whereas Robinsonian discrimination provides a relatively simple explanation for
the persisting empirical regularity of the gender pay gap, it is diﬃcult to interpret
this pay gap as a long-run equilibrium outcome using Becker’s (1971) concept of
discrimination due to distaste without assuming some sort of market power on the
demand-side. Moreover, employers’ actions remain proﬁt-maximizing when engaging
in Robinsonian discrimination, whereas they must be biased by irrational prejudices
when engaging in discrimination due to distaste because their proﬁts are reduced in
this case even if employers have considerable monopsony power (see, e.g., Bowlus &
Eckstein 2002).
An open question that could not be empirically investigated here is the reason for25
the less wage-elastic labor supply of women. Potential explanations are diﬀerent
preferences over non-wage job characteristics and a higher degree of immobility of
women. Manning (2003, pp. 47–9, 199–208) presents some evidence for the U.S. and
the UK that women are less driven by pecuniary considerations than men when
changing jobs and face higher search frictions. For Germany, an analysis by Arntz
(2005) shows that unemployed women are less inclined to leave local labor markets
with an unfavorable labor demand situation than men, which points in the same
direction.
Last but not least, we should also make clear that although female labor supply
is less wage-elastic and labor supply elasticities are low so that Robinsonian wage
discrimination might occur, ‘[i]t does not follow that diﬀerences in supply elasticities
necessarily generate diﬀerences in wages. Before concluding that monopsony is im-
portant, one should measure outcomes.’ (Hirsch & Schumacher 2005, p. 987) Future
research should try to take wage outcomes explicitly into account and investigate
whether the gender pay gap is reduced if one controls for ﬁrms’ monopsony power.
If this were the case, the point of Robinsonian wage discrimination of women could
be made even more convincingly.26
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